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I. INTRODUCTION
The result in Bennis v. Michigan' may be indefensible, as many
commentators believe, 2 but it is not inexplicable. To the contrary, Chief

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina; J.D., Duke University, 1983.
The author previously served as an Assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States. In that
position, he assisted in the preparation of a brief for, and presented oral argument in, the
Supreme Court in Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S.Ct. 994 (1996), on behalf of the United States as
amicus curiae supporting respondent (the State of Michigan). The author thanks Professor
Stephen A. Spitz for his helpful suggestions on a draft of this comment. The views expressed
in this comment are the solely the author's.
1. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
2. See Sandra Guerra, Family Values?: The Family As an InnocentVictim of CivilDrugAsset
Forfeiture, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 343, 366-368 (1996) (criticizing the decision of the Bennis
Court). Although the decision in Bennis has not yet generated much legal commentary, it was
quickly and almost unanimously condemned in newspaper editorials. See, e.g., Robyn E.
Blumner, Perspective, Moving One Step CloserTo a Police State, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar.
17, 1996, at 4D; Bruce Fein, Commentary, Benchmarks ofAbsurdity:A CriminalStep Too Far?,
WASH. TIES, Mar. 12, 1996, at A16; Richard Grossman, Editorial, As a Matter ofLaw Seizure
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Justice Rehnquist, writing for the. Court, explained the result with his
customary candor and brevity. 4 He said that the result flowed from the
"guilty property" fiction of civil forfeiture law and that this fiction was "too
firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be
now displaced." 5
Critics of forfeiture law, understandably, ridicule the "guilty property"
fiction; it is an easy target. 6 Most critics do not, however, consider why that

Ruling Belongs in 19th Century, POST STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Mar. 11, 1996, at A8;
Charles Levendosky, Op Ed, High CourtTakes Low Roadon Forfeiture,DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
Mar. 14, 1996, at 15A; Debra J. Saunders, Editorial, A Convoluted Court Ruling: Is Fairness
Totally Disconnectedfrom the Law?, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 13, 1996, at Al8; George
Will, ConfiscationRuling Serves As a Warning, FRESNO BEE, Mar. 11, 1996, at B5; cf. It's a
Legislative Job, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Mar. 15, 1996, at B6 (arguing that the Court in Bennis
properly applied its precedent and that protection for "innocent owners" should be supplied by
legislation, rather than court decisions).
3. See George M. Dery III, Adding Injury to Insult: The Supreme Court'sExtension of Civil
ForfeituretoIts IllogicalExtremein Bennis v. Michigan, 48 S.C. L. REv. 359 (1997). InBennis,
Detroit police officers caught John Bennis engaged in a sexual act with a prostitute in the front
seat of a car that he co-owned with his wife, Tina Bennis. See Michigan ex rel. Wayne County
Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Mich. 1994), aff'd, Bennis, 116 S. Ct. 994. In
addition to charging Mr. Bennis with a crime, the Prosecutor for Wayne County Michigan (in
which Detroit is located) brought a civil proceeding seeking forfeiture of the car, as a "nuisance,"
based on its use in the crime. See id. Ms. Bennis argued that, because she had not known that
her husband would use the car illegally, the forfeiture of her interest in the car violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
(which applies to States under the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374 (1994)). See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997. The United States Supreme Court, by a
five-to-four vote, affirmed the Michigan Supreme Court's decision to uphold the forfeiture. See
id. at 996.
4. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined the Chief Justice's majority
opinion. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996. Justices Thomas and Ginsburg also filed separate,
concurring opinions. See id. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Souter
and Breyer joined. See id. Justice Kennedy filed a separate, dissenting opinion. See id.
5. Id. at 1001 (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511
(1921)). The "guilty property" fiction holds that the property to be forfeited is itself to blame
for the wrongdoing on the basis of which forfeiture is sought. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,684-686 (1974). Thus, in an early decision upholding
the forfeiture of a pirate ship, the Court stated that "[t]he vessel which commits the aggression
is treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches,
without any reference whatsoever to the characteror conduct of the owner." Harmony v. United
States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844) (Story, J.). For a concise history of forfeiture law,
see 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 77.01 (David A. Thomas ed., 1996 Cum. Supp.).
6. See, e.g., Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on
Deodands, Forfeitures,Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q.
169, 257 (1973) (stating that the guilty property fiction "is about as irrational and unjust a
proposition as a sober mind can concoct"); Robert Lieske, Civil ForfeitureLaw: Replacing the
Common Law with a Common Sense Application of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, 21 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 265, 292, 298-99 (1995) (tracing current abuse of civil
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fiction is "so firmly fixed" in the Court's "punitive and remedial jurisprudence." 7 Nonetheless, I believe that the important role of the guilty property
fiction in the broader scheme of the Court's "punitive and remedial jurisprudence" is the key to the Bennis decision.
If the Court in Bennis had abandoned the guilty property fiction, its
decision would have cast doubt on the application of other well-settled
"punitive and remedial" doctrines. These include the doctrines of strict and

vicarious liability and double jeopardy. My purpose is not to praise Bennis,
but to explain it, briefly, in terms of its implications for these other legal
theories. I hope to show that critics of the guilty-property fiction should focus
their efforts, not on its absurdity, but, instead, on the way in which the Court

might lay it to rest without unduly disturbing other firmly entrenched (and
perhaps more defensible) doctrines.
I1.

THE SUPREME COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY ADHERED TO THE "GUILTY
PROPERTY" FICTION OF FORFEITURE LAW

Say what you will about Bennis; you cannot say that it broke with the
past. Over the years, the Court has consistently upheld the civil forfeiture of
property that has been used illegally without the owner's knowledge!
Granted, the Court has sometimes held its nose while doing so. In J. W.
Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, for example, the Court wondered
aloud about the fairness of forfeiting a car used to transport liquor without the
owner's knowledge.9 In later decisions, the Court has hinted that the
Constitution may forbid the forfeiture of property belonging to a "truly"
innocent owner.10 But as Justice Scalia remarked during the oral argument

forfeiture laws to continuing judicial acceptance of guilty property fiction); Roger Pilon, Can
AmericanAsset ForfeitureLawBe Justified?, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 311, 332 (1994) (finding
the "personification" and "taint" doctrines underlying the guilty property fiction "simply too
fantastic to require much rebuttal").
7. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001 (quoting Goldsmith-GrantCo., 254 U.S. at 511).
8. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998-99; see also United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S.
111, 119 (1993) (plurality opinion) (noting the historic availability of forfeiture "notwithstanding
the innocence of the owner"); Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683 ("the innocence of the owner of
property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense") (citing Van Oster
v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 466-69 (1926); Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 509; Dobbins's
Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 399-401 (1878); Harmony, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 23335; The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827)).
9. 254 U.S. at 510 ("There is strength. . . in the contention that... [the statute at issue]
seems to violate that justice which should be the foundation of the due process of law required
by the Constitution", quotedin Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001 (Thomas, J., concurring) (ellipses and
bracketed material added by Justice Thomas)).
10. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 617 (1993). In Calero-Toledo, the Court said:
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and as the Court observed in its opinion, these suggestions of fairness-based
limits on forfeiture were dicta." While Ms. Bennis was armed with dicta,
her opponent, the Prosecutor for Wayne County, Michigan, was armed with
holdings, including several from this century, which sustained the forfeiture
of an innocent owner's property.12
This point is not made to defend the dignity of the current Court or to
defend the result in Bennis. It is made to suggest that there is an important
explanation for the Bennis decision. If the decision were less consistent with
the reasoning and result of precedent than it is, it might be dismissed as the
reactionary sport of a "head in the sand" majority. 3 But the consistency and
tenacity with which the Court has clung to the guilty-property fiction suggests
that something more is going on. Here is my thesis of what it is: Far from
demonstrating that the Bennis majority had its head in the sand, the decision
reflects the majority's awareness of the broader remedial and punitive
jurisprudence of which civil forfeiture is a part. I will discuss the remedial
jurisprudence and then the punitive.
III. AN ABANDONMENT OF THE "GUILTY PROPERTY" FICTION WOULD CAST
DOUBT ON CERTAIN APPLICATIONS OF STRICT AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY

It therefore has been implied that it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim
of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without
his privity or consent. Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who proved not
only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he
had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture
served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive.
416 U.S. at 689-90 (citations and footnote omitted).
11. See Transcript of Oral Argument in Bennis, No. 94-8729, 1995 WL 712350, at *54;
Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 999.
12. Justice Stevens asserts in his dissent in Bennis that the majority's decision is "novel[]."
116 S.Ct. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He does not, however, persuasively distinguish
Bennis from prior civil forfeiture decisions by the Court. That precedent includes three decisions
upholding the civil forfeiture of cars that were used illegally without the owner's knowledge. See
Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 466-69 (1926) (upholding forfeiture of car used to transport
liquor in violation of state law, despite owner's claim that she lacked knowledge of illegal use);
United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. 321,332 (1926) (upholding "forfeiture of the interest
in a vehicle of one who had no guilty knowledge that it was to be used for an illegal purpose");
Goldsmith-GrantCo., 254 U.S. at 509 (upholding forfeiture ofa taxicab used to transport alcohol
in violation of federal law, even though owner had no knowledge of, or even "any notice or
reason to suspect," the illegal use). Justice Stevens argues that, in such cases, the cars facilitated
the crime (transportation of contraband) in a manner that cars cannot facilitate prostitution. See
Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 1006. Common experience, as well as the record in Bennis, however,
indicates that cars do indeed facilitate prostitution. See Michigan ex rel. Wayne County
Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 491 (Mich. 1994).
13. Dery, supra note 3, at 379.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss2/7
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Consider the most straightforward way that the Court could have decided

the case in favor of Ms. Bennis. One might begin with the issue before the
Court as framed by the media: Does the Constitution permit the government
to confiscate an innocent owner's property? 4 Most people would agree that
the answer should be "no." The principle underlying that answer, at this level
of analysis, would be that the Constitution prohibits the government from
confiscating innocent owners' property. The problem with deciding Bennis
on that principle is that the government takes innocent owners' property in
other contexts. Such takings may occur under the doctrines of strict or
vicarious liability."5
For example, many states make the owner of a car financially responsible
for any accident caused by someone to whom the owner has loaned the car. 16
A car owner's liability for such an accident may exceed the value of the car
by many orders of magnitude. In some states, the owner cannot escape
liability by showing that he or she had every reason to believe that the person
who borrowed the car would be careful.1 7 These financial-responsibility
laws, some of which impose vicarious liability on car owners, have never been
thought to pose a constitutional concern. To the contrary, the Court has taken

it for granted that they are constitutional."

14. See, e.g., loan Biskupic, Woman Asks Court to Shield Family Car From Straying
Husband's Forfeiture, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1995, at A25 ("'Why should a person who is
totally innocent have to give up property' used for activities unbeknown to the owner?") (quoting
Justice Breyer's question at oral argument); Paul Leavitt, Supreme Court Weighs Law Allowing
Confiscation, USA TODAY, Nov. 30, 1995, at 3A (stating that the issue in Bennis was "[a]
Michigan law that lets authorities confiscate crime-related property even if owned by innocent
people");JusticesHearCarSeizureArgument, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1995, at28 ("At issue:
The scope of government's power to confiscate property linked to crime but owned, at least
partially, by innocent people.").
15. "'Vicarious liability' may be defined as the imposition of liability upon one party for a
wrong committed by another party." Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability;An
Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 563, 563 (1988); see also 5 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES & OSCAR S. GRAY,

THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.1, at 2 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter HARPER & JAMES]; W. PAGE
KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 69, at 499 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. "Strict liability" is imposed
upon one whose conduct causes injury without fault. See 3 HARPER & JAMES, supra, § 14.1,
at 183; PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 75, at 534.
16. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15, § 73, at 522-28; 7A AM. JUR. 2D, Automobiles
& Highway Traffic § 668 (1980).
17. See Sykes, supra note 15, at 594-97.
18. See Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253,257 (1933); Van Osterv. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465,467
(1926); cf. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1991) (rejecting substantive
due process challenge to a state, common-law rule authorizing punitive damages against
corporations for the fraud of employees acting within scope of employment).
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Strict liability, or "liability without fault," is similarly common in federal
statutory schemes. A famous illustration is United States v. Park, in which the
Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a food company president for federal
health violations at company plants.1 9 The Court made it clear that the
validity of the president's conviction did not depend on whether he knew about
the violations. 2° It was enough that he stood "'in responsible relation'" to
the violations. 2 In other words, his ability to prevent the violations from
occurring or continuing if he had known of them (which he did not) was
determinative.'
Other examples of federal liability without fault arise under the Superfund
law.' According to Superfund statutes, a person who has owned land on
which a prior owner has dumped hazardous wastes may be liable for the
government's costs of responding to the release, or a threatened release, of the
wastes. This is true even if (1) the dumping of the wastes was not illegal
when it occurred; (2) the person had no reason to know about the dumping of
the wastes; and (3) the person has sold the land to a third party by the time the
wastes are discovered.24 Although the Supreme Court has not reviewed a
constitutional challenge to the retroactive imposition of strict liability under
CERCLA, the lower federal courts have consistently rejected such challenges.2

19. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 667-78 (1975).
20. See id. at 670-75 (reviewing the standard of liability accorded by the statute under which
Park was charged as well as jury instructions on that standard).
21. Id. at 668 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-281 (1943)).
22. See id. at 671.

23. The formal name for the Superfund law is the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994).
24. Under CERCLA, the government may respond to the release or threatened release of
hazardous wastes and then recover its response costs from those parties connected with the
wastes. These parties specifically include "any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1994). CERCLA defines the term "facility" broadly to
include not just industrial facilities, but any place where a hazardous substance has "come to be
located." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B) (1994). The concept of "disposal" has also been defined and
interpreted broadly to include almost any dispersal or movement of a hazardous substance. See
4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAzARDous WASTES AND SUBSTANCES
§ 8.12.B. 1, at 674 & n.47 (1992). As a result, "the past owners who are drawn into the liability
net include not only the fellow whose historical bad judgment polluted the site but all those other
owners who dug, and pushed the soil about, and otherwise manipulated the surface." Id. It does
not matter that the disposal occurred prior to the enactment of CERCLA, nor that the former
owner of the land was not to blame for the disposal. See id. § 8.13.A, at 683-685. CERCLA
was amended in 1986 "to exclude innocent landowners from the liability scheme." Id. §
8.13.C.3, at 695. That defense is "constrained in a variety of ways," however, that may often
make the burden of establishing it "insuperable." Id. § 8.13.C.3(e), at 698.
25. See RODGERS, supra note 24, at 685; cf. United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502
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The imposition of liability without guilty knowledge under the doctrines
of strict and vicarious liability is not new.26 The doctrines have deep roots
in, for instance, the law of private nuisance. A landowner sued under a
private nuisance theory can be held liable for damages caused to other
properties by the non-negligent use of the land.27 Liability without negligence could likewise attach under the separate, but similarly named doctrine
of public nuisance.' Under this latter doctrine, the government may enjoin
activities that are noxious to the public or even confiscate the offending
property.29 In such cases, it does not matter that the owner of the property
is not blameworthy.3 0 The constitutionality of government power to abate
public nuisances is well-established in a "long line of [Supreme] Court[] cases
sustaining against Due Pro&ess and Takings Clause challenges the State's use
of its 'police powers' to enjoin a property owner from activities akin to public
nuisances." 3 The Court also has upheld against constitutional attack the
government's destruction of property that created a public nuisance.32
IV. AN ABANDONMENT OF THE "GUILTY PROPERTY" FICTION WOULD ALSO
CAST DOUBT ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY CASES INVOLVING CIVIL FORFEITURE.

(S.D. Ala. 1996), appeal docketed, No. 96-6645 (11th Cir.) (argued Oct. 4, 1996).
26. 5 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 15, § 26.2 (discussing history of vicarious liability); 3
HARPER & JAMES, supra note 15, § 14.1 (discussing history of strict liability).
27. See 3 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 15, § 14.2 (discussing Rylandsv. Fletcher, 159 Eng.
Rep. 737 (1865)).
28. See William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEx. L. REv. 399, 410-16 (1942)
(explaining the difference between private nuisance and public nuisance); id. at 416-18
(explaining that courts have imposed strict liability in both public and private nuisance
proceedings).
29. See id. at 411.
30. See id. at 417-18.
31. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022 (1992); see also Grosfield
v. United States, 276 U.S. 494 (1928) (affirming decree entered under the National Prohibition
Act "padlocking" premises used by tenant, without lessor's knowledge, for distilling alcohol);
United States v. Boynton, 297 F. 261,266-68 (E.D. Mich. 1924) (using public nuisance doctrine
to enforce prohibition); Catherine R. Connors, Back to the Future:The "NuisanceException" to
the Just Compensation Clause, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 139 (1990) (discussing the Supreme Court's
conception of nuisance exception to takings); Andrew R. Mylott, Comment, Is There a Doctrine
in the House?: The Nuisance Exception to the Takings Clause Has Been Mortally Wounded by
Lucas, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1299, 1301 n.l1, 1306-08 (discussing the use of nuisance doctrine
in takings cases prior to Lucas).
32. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 399
(1895); see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,669 (1887) (allowing state to declare and abate
alcohol manufacturing site as a nuisance).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:389

One can distinguish Bennis from the other settings described above in
which liability without guilty knowledge is imposed. Indeed, Ms. Bennis
attempted to distinguish them on the ground that liability in those other settings
dominantly served some non-punitive purpose-such as to provide compensation or to reallocate a loss to the party best able to bear it-whereas the
forfeiture of her car dominantly served a punitive purpose.3 3 Non-punitive
purposes certainly underlie the provisions making car owners financially
responsible for accidents caused by others driving their cars. Those provisions
reflect the determination that, if the negligent driver evades or cannot pay the
judgment, the loss should be borne by the owner rather than by the injured
victim.34 Similar reasoning may justify imposing liability upon the company
president in Parkand upon the landowner in a CERCLA case, instead of upon
the public. 35 It is difficult, however, to conceive of a comparable justification for the result in Bennis; indeed, it seems perverse to impose a financial
burden on Ms. Bennis when it was she, more than the public, who was
victimized by Mr. Bennis's illegal use of the family car.36 In defending the
forfeiture of Ms. Bennis's car in the state courts, the Wayne County
Prosecutor seemed unwittingly to lend credence to Ms. Bennis's contention
that the forfeiture served no legitimate, non-punitive purpose. The prosecutor's lower-court briefs highlighted the punitive purpose and effect of the
forfeiture scheme.37
A punitive rationale ostensibly provided a more promising basis for a
decision in Ms. Bennis's favor than a rationale resting on the broad principle
(discussed in Section I supra) that the government may never take the
property of an innocent person. For one thing, the punitive rationale appeared
not to cast doubt on the validity of doctrines like strict and vicarious liability,
since those doctrines may, in general, be justified as serving non-punitive
purposes. For another thing, the punitive rationale had some foundation in the
case law. Specifically, decisions based on the doctrine of substantive due
process suggest that the Constitution forbids the government from punishing

33. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000; Transcript of Oral Argument in Bennis, No. 94-8729,
1995 WL 712350, at *13-14.
34. See generallySykes, supra note 15, at 594-97 (discussing the vicarious liability of motor
vehicle owners).
35. See Park, 421 U.S. at 670-73 (discussing justification for strict liability under food and
drug laws); Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1458, 1519
(1986) (discussing justification for strict liability under CERCLA); cf. David G. Owen,
Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681, 703-14 (1980)
(evaluating conventional justifications for strict products liability, many of which are applicable
outside the defective-products context).
36. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. See id. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting State of Michigan's brief in the Michigan
Supreme Court).
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a person who has no knowledge of or involvement in the conduct for which

she is being punished."
The problem with this principle is that it begs the question of what
constitutes "punishment." This is not an easy question. The short answer is:
"It depends."39' At the time of Bennis, the Court had defined punishment in
different ways, depending on the constitutional provision involved.' The
most recent such case, Austin v. United States, held that civil forfeiture may
be "punishment" and, as such, subject to challenge under the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 4 Austin contained dicta, moreover,
suggesting that civil forfeiture could also be punishment for purposes of other
constitutional provisions,42 including the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth

38. See SouthwesternTel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482,490-91 (1915) (invalidating
penalty against telephone company on due process grounds because company's conduct involved
"no intentional wrongdoing; no departure from any prescribed or known standard of action, and
no reckless conduct"); see also TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 454 & n.17 (1993) (plurality opinion) (following Danaher); id. at 479 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Danaherwith approval). The Court has understood the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to have both a "procedural" and a "substantive"
component. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 10.6(a),

at 346-48 (5th ed. 1995). The procedural component requires the government to use fair
procedures when it seeks to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property. See, e.g., Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344-45 (1976). The substantive component "bars certain arbitrary,
wrongful government actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them.'" Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 331 (1986)).
39. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (stating that question
whether a sanction is punitive "has been extremely difficult and elusive of solution").
40. See, e.g., Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 781-83 (1994) (finding
a state tax on marijuana to be punishment for purposes of Double Jeopardy Clause of Fifth
Amendment); Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 (holding civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (7)
constitutes "punishment" for purposes of Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment); United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 436 (1989) (considering "whether and under what circumstances
a civil penalty may constitute 'punishment' for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis"); United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (pretrial detention was not "punishment" for purposes of
substantive due process); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608-10 (1967) (civil commitment
of sexual psychopath under state law was "punishment" for procedural due process purposes);
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 165-66 (loss of citizenship was punishment that could,
consistently with due process, be imposed only with constitutional protections afforded criminal
defendants).
41. 509 U.S. at 619-22; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
42. The Court in Austin explored the historical justification for civilly forfeiting property
owned by someone other than the person whose illegal conduct causes the forfeiture. See 509
U.S. at 611-18. The Court concluded that the justification rests "at bottom, on the notion that
the owner has been negligent in allowing his property to be misused and that he is properly
at 618. In so concluding, the Court in Austin
punished for that negligence." Id. at 615; see id.
relied on, among other cases, Halper, a double jeopardy case. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610-11,
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Amendment.4 3 The Austin dicta cast doubt on an earlier line of Supreme
Court cases holding that civil forfeiture is not punishment for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 4
The apparent conflict between Austin and the line of old double jeopardy
cases on the issue of whether civil forfeiture is punitive was before the Court
when Bennis was briefed and argued. Specifically, it was posed by two other
cases then on the Court's docket, which involved the civil forfeiture of
property owned by a criminal defendant. 45 Those cases had not been fully
briefed and argued when Bennis was decided.46 It would have been difficult
for the Court to find that civil forfeiture was punitive in Bennis without also
finding it punitive in the two pending double-jeopardy cases. A decision in
favor of Ms. Bennis based on the substantive due process case law cited above
therefore might have required the Court to overrule its prior decisions holding
that civil forfeiture is not punitive for double jeopardy purposes. The Court
would have done so, moreover, without full briefing and oral argument on
whether the prior, double-jeopardy decisions warranted being overruled.
The Court in Bennis might have avoided the need to characterize the
forfeiture there as punitive by merely holding the Wayne County Prosecutor
to his acknowledgement in lower-court briefs that the forfeiture of Ms.
Bennis's car was primarily punitive.47 Taking that route, the Court would
have assumed that the forfeiture was punitive, as the Wayne County Prosecu-

621.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb").
44. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2140-42 (1996) (describingprior case law);
see also Matthew P. Harrington, Rethinking In Rem: The Supreme Court's New (andMisguided)
Approach to Civil Forfeiture, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 281, 335-36 (1994) (criticizingAustin).
45. In United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996),
the United States brought a civil proceeding to forfeit Ursery's house on the ground that he had
processed marijuana there. See id. at 570. After Ursery paid the governmentmore than $13,000
to settle the forfeiture proceeding, he was convicted of manufacturing marijuana. Id. The Sixth
Circuit held that his conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because it was a second
punishment for the same offense. See id. at 572-76. In United States v. $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996), the defendants were first
convicted of a crime, and then the government sought civil forfeiture of their property based on
its connection with the crime. See id. at 1214-15. The Ninth Circuit held that the forfeiture
constituted a second punishment and therefore violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at
1215-22. The Supreme Court granted the government's petitions for certiorari, consolidated the
two cases, United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996), and reversed in both. See United
States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
46. Bennis was decided on March 4, 1996. At that time, the Court had granted certiorari in
United States v. Ursery, No. 95-345, and United States v. $405,089.23 in United States
Currency, No. 95-346, but the cases had not been fully briefed and were not argued until April
17, 1996. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2135.
47. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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tor had conceded, without deciding the issue as an independent matter. That
escape route was made difficult, however, by the prosecutor's retreat from this
concession in its briefs and argument before the Court.4" Moreover, if the
Court in Bennis had struck down the forfeiture in Bennis based on the
prosecutor's concession that the forfeiture was punitive, it would have cast
doubt on the validity of the many civil forfeiture laws that do not expressly
protect "innocent owners."" 9 The lower courts would be left without
guidance on how to determine whether these laws are punitive.
If this were not enough to give pause, the Court would have had to
answer another difficult question that lay beyond the issue of whether the
forfeiture was punitive. This further question was: Upon what provision of
the Constitution could it base a decision in Ms. Bennis's favor? Ms. Bennis
staked her claim on the Takings Clause and the substantive component of the
Due Process Clause.5" The Court has divided deeply in recent years over the
existence and nature of the doctrine of substantive due process.5" In any
event, its decisions appeared to require any outcome in Ms. Bennis's favor to
52
be based on the Takings Clause, rather than on substantive due process.
If the Takings Clause was chosen, however, the Court would have had to
explain why the Bennis case did not fall within the "nuisance exception" to the
Takings Clause (to which reference was made above).53
The Court could not base a decision in Ms. Bennis's favor upon the
Excessive Fines Clause, even though that Clause might have provided the most
attractive ground for a ruling in her favor.54 The Court was prevented from

48. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1006-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Transcript of Oral Argument
in Bennis, No. 94-8729, 1995 WL 712350, at *42 (attorney for Michigan states that "if there was
punishment, it was incidental to the regulatory aim of this police power.").
49. "Innocent owner" provisions are included in the major federal statutes authorizing civil
forfeiture of property that has been used illegally. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994).
Some federal forfeiture statutes, however, do not contain such provisions. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 545 (1994) (customs); 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994) (racketeering); 19 U.S.C. § 1595a (1994)
(unlawful importation); 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (1994) (forfeiture of monetary instruments). As for
state statutory schemes, the innocent owner defense is certainly not unfamiliar. See, e.g., S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-53-586 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995) (innocent owner defense to forfeiture of
property connected with drug crimes); id. § 50-11-740 (allowing owners of property connected
with fish and game violations to "show cause" why forfeiture should not occur).
50. See Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 997-98, 1001.
51. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
52. "Where a particular Amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more
generalized notion of "substantive due process," must be the guide for analyzing these claims.'"
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989)).
53. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
54. Under the Excessive Fines Clause, Ms. Bennis would have argued that the forfeiture of
the car imposed a punishment on her that was grossly disproportionate to her culpability.
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relying on that Clause by Ms. Bennis's failure to initiate such a challenge
below. Ms. Bennis's failure to do so was probably the result of bad timing:
Austin, the Court's first decision holding that a civil forfeiture can be an
unconstitutionally "excessive fine," did not come down until Ms. Bennis's case
was on appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.O5 Although Austin would not
have been a sure ticket to success, on a properly developed record, the
Excessive Fines Clause may have provided the strongest basis for invalidating
the forfeiture in Bennis. 6 Moreover, the Court could have relied on the
Excessive Fines Clause in Bennis without casting any doubt on its old line of
double jeopardy cases (which had held that civil forfeiture is not punitive)
beyond the doubt created by the Austin decision itself. In any event, Bennis's
rejection of due-process and Takings Clause claims does not foreclose
excessive-fines claims by innocent owners.5 7 Indeed, the various opinions in
Bennis suggest that a majority of the Court might well be receptive to an
excessive-fines claim in an appropriate future case."
55. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also State v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731
(Mich. App. 1993). Ms. Bennis's appeal was submitted on Dec. 17, 1992; Austin was decided
in 1993. Even if Ms. Bennis had been permitted to raise an excessive-fines argument in the
Michigan Supreme Court, she might have decided not to do so because the trial court record had
not been developed to support such reasoning. To support an excessive-fines argument, Ms.
Bennis would have wanted to put on evidence of her husband's prior criminal activities (if any),
her knowledge of those activities, and the impact upon her-the loss of a car.
56. Austin does not make clear whether an innocent owner can prove that a forfeiture violates
the Excessive Fines Clause. The Court in Austin declined to describe the standard for
determining whether a civil forfeiture is "excessive." 509 U.S. at 621-22. Some of the
approaches developed by lower federal courts do not appear to take into account the innocence
of the owner. For example, courts have held that the value of the subject property should be
compared to the harm caused by its illegal use. See generally United States v. One Parcel
Property Located at 427 & 429 Hall Street, 74 F.3d 1165, 1170-73 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussing
various approaches and adopting an approach for property owned by the person who committed
the crime that led to forfeiture); Guerra, supranote 2, at 361 n.83 (discussing various approaches
of lower federal courts).
57. Other constitutional provisions may also invalidate certain civil forfeiture statutes. For
example, some forfeiture statutes limit "innocent owner" protection in a way that may violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, the Michigan statute under which the Bennis car was forfeited
protects holders of liens on property to be forfeited, but not holders of other types of property
interests. Under that statute, the proceeds of the sale of forfeited property are used first to pay
the expenses of the sale and then to pay any liens "created without the lienor having any notice
that such property was being used or was to be used for the maintenance of a nuisance." MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3825(3) (West 1987). Subsequently, any balance goes into the state
treasury. See id. It is unfair, and perhaps a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, for the
State to protect innocent lienholders but not innocent, co-owner spouses.
58. As indicated, Bennis was a five-to-four decision. See supra note 4. Justice Ginsburg
makes it clear that she based her vote on narrow grounds. See id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). She observed that Michigan's right to forfeit the car was uncontested; the issue was
whether Ms. Bennis had a right to be compensated for her interest in the car. See id. Justice
Ginsburg regarded the impact of denying Ms. Bennis compensation as minimal. She noted that
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In sum, the Court could not have characterized the forfeiture in Bennis as
punitive without raising serious questions in other areas of the law. This
Section has focused on the serious questions that would arise in doublejeopardy challenges to civil forfeitures. But the issue of what constitutes
punishment arises in cases involving other constitutional provisions, besides
the Double Jeopardy Clause, and other civil sanctions besides civil forfeiture.5 9 The Court in fact will face the issue this term in a setting quite
different from those discussed here. 6°
V. CONCLUSION

It is no wonder that the Court in Bennis clung so tightly to the "guilty
property" fiction of civil forfeiture law. The Court could quite reasonably
have been concerned about how abandoning that fiction might affect its
"punitive and remedial jurisprudence." 6' That concern may have been
the value of Ms. Bennis's interest in the car was negligible, especially after the costs of the
forfeiture proceeding were deducted from the proceeds of selling the car. She further noted that
the Bennises had another car. See id. Justice Ginsburg also attached importance to the
Michigan Supreme Court's indication that it would not permit "exorbitant" forfeitures. See id.
In these circumstances, Justice Ginsburg concluded that "Michigan ...has not embarked on an
experiment to punish innocent third parties." Id. Similarly, Justice Thomas expressed the view
that the forfeiture was not punitive. See id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas
determined that, because almost no money was left after the Bennis car was sold, the forfeiture
merely "prevent[ed] the risk of continued criminal use of it by Mr. Bennis." Id. He observed
that the State could have accomplished the same thing by destroying the car, instead of selling
it, in which case the State "would have had a plausible argument that the order for destruction
was 'remedial.'" Id. Justice Thomas reasoned that, "if the forfeiture of the car here ...can
appropriately be characterized as 'remedial' action, then the more severe problems involved in
punishing someone not found to have engaged in wrongdoing of any kind do not arise." Id.
Thus, Justices Ginsburg and Thomas left open the possibility that a punitive civil forfeiture could
violate the Constitution.
59. See cases cited supra note 40 (addressing whether various civil sanctions are punitive for
purposes of various constitutional doctrines).
60. A few days before Bennis was decided, the Supreme Court of Kansas struck down that
state's Sexually Violent Predator Act (Act), holding that the indefinite civil confinement of people
covered by the Act violates substantive due process. In re Care & Treatment of Hendricks, 912
P.2d 129, 138 (Kan.), cert. grantedsub nom., Kansas v. Hendricks, 116 S.Ct. 2522 (1996).
The U.S. Supreme Court stayed the Kansas Supreme Court's decision (which, unless stayed,
could have caused the release of any then-confined "sexually violent predators"). See Kansas v.
Hendricks, 116 S. Ct. 1540 (1996). The Court later granted petitions for a writ of certiorari filed
by each side in the case. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 116 S.Ct. 2522 (1996). Among the
questions before the Court are: whether the Act, "though labeled a civil proceeding, [is] so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to require that it be considered criminal"; whether the Act
"violate[s] the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy"; and whether the Act violates
"the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws." Brief for Leroy Hendricks CrossPetitioner, Kansas v. Hendricks, Nos. 95-1649 & 95-9075, 1996 WL 450661, at *i(U.S., Aug.
1, 1996).
61. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001 (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254
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particularly acute because of the parties' failure to address the possible impact
of abandoning the fiction; the absence of an excessive-fines challenge; and the
pendency on the Court's docket of double-jeopardy cases raising related issues.
Given those circumstances, as well as the brevity of the majority's opinion and
the narrow margin by which the case was decided, one should not read the
Court's refusal to abandon the guilty-property fiction "now"62 to mean that
it will never do so.63
Bennis makes clear, however, that the Court will not abandon the guilty
property fiction of forfeiture law merely because it is old and perhaps
indefensible. Other doctrines have grown up around the fiction that are
themselves firmly fixed in the Court's "punitive and remedial jurisprudence. "I These doctrines include, but are not limited to, doctrines of strict
and vicarious liability and double jeopardy. To be sure, these doctrines, in
some applications, themselves impose arguably punitive liability on people
who are as innocent as Ms. Bennis (or who have already been punished).
Perhaps such applications are themselves unconstitutional. If so, perhaps the
Court should broadly re-evaluate what constitutes innocence and punishment
for purposes of the Constitution. The Court must, however, be convinced of
the need for such a broad reevaluation, and of the achievabiity of a unified
theory for defining innocence and punishment before it will abandon the guilty
property fiction on grounds that unsettle other well-settled doctrines of
liability. Alternatively, the Court must be convinced that there is a way to lay
the fiction to rest that does not have unduly broad doctrinal consequences.

U.S. 505, 511 (1921)).
62. Id.
63. The Court will have fewer occasions to address the continuing vitality of the guilty
property fiction as more and more legislatures adopt statutes protecting innocent owners. As
noted above, supra note 49, the major federal forfeiture statutes already include such provisions.
Moreover, a bill introduced in the last Congress would provide an innocent owner defense under
all federal forfeiture statutes. See H.R. 3194, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. § 2 (1996). Indeed, the
growing prevalence of statutory, innocent owner provisions may have contributed to the Court's
unwillingness to abandon the fiction in Bennis. The Court might regard legislative protection for
innocent owners as preferable to judicial protection based on the Constitution, among other
reasons, because the former do not have uncertain constitutional sources and implications. Justice
Scalia suggested as much in responding to the United States' contention, based on Calero-Toledo,
see supra note 10, that the Constitution protects owners who show that they have taken "all
reasonable steps" to prevent illegal use of the property to be forfeited. He said:
[Als an original matter, if I were writing a statute I might well buy your. . . all
reasonable steps standard. It seems like a good idea.
But we're not writing a statute. Where do you get it from? I mean, where do
you find it in our historical tradition, or is it just that . . . we should say, well, it
seems like a good idea, it must be constitutional law.
Transcript of Oral Argument in Bennis, No. 94-8729, 1995 WL 712350, at *54.
64. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001 (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254
U.S. 505, 511 (1921)).
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Because of Bennis, critics of the fiction now bear the burden of persuasion.a5

65. In its amicus brief in Bennis, the United States argued that, with certain exceptions, the
Constitution prohibits the civil forfeiture of property owned by someone who showed that she
took "all reasonable steps" to prevent the illegal use that led to the forfeiture. Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, at 7-21. The stated exceptions to the
proposed "all reasonable steps" standard related to forfeitures ofcontraband and forfeitures based
on the traditional doctrines of strict and vicarious liability. Perhaps because of my involvement
in that brief, I believe that the Court should adopt an "all reasonable steps" standard, qualified
by appropriate, historically based exceptions. The Court's decision in Bennis does not foreclose
the adoption of such a standard since Ms. Bennis did not allege or attempt to prove that she took
all reasonable steps to prevent the illegal use of the car. This is not to suggest that there were
any reasonable steps Ms. Bennis could have taken. Instead, I mean to suggest that the Court
might have ruled differently if Ms. Bennis had alleged and attempted to prove that there were no
steps that she reasonably could be expected to have taken to avoid the illegal use. While
endorsing the "all reasonable steps" standard, I recognize that it would be difficult to apply in
many cases. See Guerra, supra note 2, at 376-90 (discussing the application of an "all reasonable
steps" standard in a family setting).
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